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The aim of this study was to examine the information acquisition strategies of expert
and competent non-expert intensive care physicians during two simulated diagnostic
scenarios involving respiratory distress in an infant. Speciﬁcally, the information acquisition
performance of six experts and 12 competent non-experts was examined using an eye-
tracker during the initial 90 s of the assessment of the patient. The results indicated
that, in comparison to competent non-experts, experts recorded longer mean ﬁxations,
irrespective of the scenario. When the dwell times were examined against speciﬁc areas
of interest, the results revealed that competent non-experts recorded greater overall dwell
times on the nurse, where experts recorded relatively greater dwell times on the head and
face of the manikin. In the context of the scenarios, experts recorded differential dwell
times, spending relatively more time on the head and face during the seizure scenario than
during the coughing scenario. The differences evident between experts and competent
non-experts were interpreted as evidence of the relative availability of task-speciﬁc cues or
heuristics in memory that might direct the process of information acquisition amongst
expert physicians. The implications are discussed for the training and assessment of
diagnostic skills.
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INTRODUCTION
The accurate initial assessment of clinical patients in time-critical
emergencies is an essential component of timely and appropriate
intervention by critical care teams (Pham et al., 2012). It mit-
igates the further deterioration of the patient’s condition and
potentially reduces mortality and the additional burden on an
already strained healthcare system. Nevertheless, it is a process
that occurs within a short time-period and with potentially min-
imal information, thereby increasing the likelihood of error (Ely
et al., 2011).
On the basis that assessments are required within a relatively
short period and with minimal information, it is likely that a
physician will engage lean and rapid cognitive strategies such
as satisﬁcing, relying on productions or relationships between
patterns of information to guide the initial process of diagno-
sis (Simon, 1972; Marewski and Gigerenzer, 2012). Productions
comprise rules-of-thumb or condition-action (IF-THEN) state-
ments that are resident in memory and that can be used to assist
the interpretation of a situation or event (Anderson, 1982; Hamm,
2014). For example, in the medical context, IF a patient presents
with an elevated temperature, THEN it is normally associated with
the presence of an infection.
The development and application of productions is gener-
ally associated with a reduction in cognitive load, since their
application obviates the requirement for compensatory strategies
that require the retention of task-related information in working
memory (Sweller, 1988). However, such rules-of-thumb are, by
deﬁnition, not necessarily applicable in all situations, and there are
many cases where the application of productions has been asso-
ciated with the commission of errors (Croskerry, 2003; Norman
et al., 2014).
The acquisition of information as a prelude to the diagnosis of
a particular condition is based, in part, upon the features that are
immediately apparent onpresentation to the physician (Croskerry,
2009a; Stolper et al., 2011).Where an association exists inmemory,
a feature or combination of features is presumed to trigger a pro-
duction that will be interpreted as the basis of a diagnosis or will
provide the impetus for the acquisition of additional information
necessary to form a diagnosis (Khader et al., 2011). This process
is consistent theoretically with the initial stages of recognition-
driven decision-making where the condition-action statements
that comprise productions are referred to as cues (Klein, 2008).
The acquisition and application of cues is thought to explain
the rapid and consistently accurate behavior of genuine experts
(Mann et al., 2007; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). In the context of
the Recognition-Primed Decision model, cues trigger associations
in memory that subsequently provide the basis for mental sim-
ulations that, in turn, guide a response (Klein, 2008). Brunswik
(1955), in his Lens Model, also proposes that the likelihood of
an association being triggered is dependent upon the frequency
with which features in the environment match features in mem-
ory. Finally, Stokes et al. (1997) incorporate cues as the precursor
to diagnosis in their theoretical model of expert decision-making
in the aviation context.
Like productions, cues are essentially feature-event/object
relationships in memory that enable the rapid assessment of
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a situation and, subsequently, the formulation of a response
(Wiggins, 2006, 2012). Establishing the existence of cues has gen-
erally been inferred on the basis of responses to domain-speciﬁc
stimuli. For example, Morrison et al. (2013) demonstrated that,
in comparison to non-experts, expert forensic investigators were
relatively consistent and responded more rapidly in assessing the
relatedness of feature/event pairs relating to a murder investi-
gation. Similarly, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) established that
the acquisition of weather-related information differed between
experts and non-expert pilots, with the former being less likely to
access information in the sequence in which it was presented. This
behavior has been interpreted as evidence to suggest a greater level
of cue utilization amongst experts.
The association between levels of cue utilization and expertise
has been established in squash (Abernethy, 1990), power con-
trol (Loveday et al., 2013a), pediatric assessment (Loveday et al.,
2013b), and aviation (Wiggins et al., 2014). Measures of cue uti-
lization have also differentiated performance in the context of
software engineering (Loveday andWiggins,2014). However, these
approaches have been based on generalized behavior and there is
no indication as to the speciﬁc cues involved and how they might
be activated in response to the presence of features.
As experts gain experience within a particular context,
Anderson (1982) suggests that productions are revised so that they
become more precise and discriminate between different circum-
stances. Referred to as discrimination, it is a process that coincides
with generalization where it becomes evident that a particular
production is equally applicable across a range of conditions. This
combination of discrimination and generalization may explain
both the domain speciﬁcity of experts, together with their capacity
to perceive underlying similarities between situations (Shanteau,
1988).
If experts possess a highly reﬁned repertoire of task-related
cues in memory, then the immediate features associated with two
diagnostic scenarios that differ in their immediate features but
incorporate a similar intrinsic etiology, should trigger the bottom-
up application of distinct cues, and these differences should be
evident in differences in the process of information acquisition
(Patel and Groen, 1986; Croskerry, 2009b). Empirical support for
this capacity for bottom-up discrimination can be drawn from
research into the Einstellung Effect in which visual attention dur-
ing expert problem-solving is implicitly drawn toward familiar
solutions, even at the expense of novelty (Bilalic´ et al., 2010). Since
competent non-experts have yet to develop highly specialized cues,
they are not expected to alter their information acquisition in
response to the differences in the immediate features of the task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The participants in the present study were drawn from a conve-
nience sample of medical practitioners of different levels of grade
and seniority, working in the pediatric and neonatal intensive care
units of a tertiary children’s hospital. The local research and ethics
committee approved the study, and individual participant consent
was obtained from each clinician examined.
The participants comprised 11 male and seven female physi-
cians employed in either pediatric or neonatal intensive care.
Their mean age was 40.5 years, SD = 10.6. Establishing that
expertise, rather than experience, has been acquired, requires
that some formal criterion be established that is typically based
on measures of performance. In the context of medical prac-
titioners, an indirect measure of expertise is the seniority of
their role (Patel and Groen, 1991). This constitutes recogni-
tion that they have successfully attained a level of performance
where their medical interventions are both accurate and consis-
tent over an extended period of time. While a positive relationship
will inevitably exist between years of accumulated experience
and performance, the recognition of expertise amongst peers
presumes that a level of performance has been reached that is
exceptional in comparison to other practitioners (Loveday and
Wiggins, 2014). Therefore, consistent with this perspective, the
participants were classiﬁed as expert or competent non-experts
based on their occupational position (consultant/staff special-
ist, n = 6, or trainee registrar/fellow, n = 12) according to
the criteria established by Patel and Groen (1991). Their accu-
mulated experience working in medicine was between 6 and
42 years, m = 16.5, SD = 10.6, with a range of 1–35 years in
the intensive care environment, m = 9.9, SD = 10.3. Experts
recorded a mean 23.0 years experience working in intensive
care, SD = 9.33, compared to a mean 4.8 years for competent
non-experts, SD = 4.57.
SIMULATION
A realistic scenario and naturalistic environment was created
for the study by using a high-ﬁdelity infant manikin (Laerdal
SimBaby) connected to a monitor that displayed simulated phys-
iological parameters and appropriate corresponding alarms and
sounds in situ in an intensive care cot in a bedspace within the
pediatric intensive care unit of a tertiary children’s hospital. The
conﬁgurationof the roomwas typical of a bedspace in the pediatric
intensive care unit and was familiar to all study participants (see
Figure 1). Anasogastric feeding tubewas inserted and attached to a
continuous feeding pump with enteral feed attached. The manikin
was also connected to nasal prong oxygen with a wall-mounted
oxygen ﬂow-meter, an intravenous drip via a peripherally inserted
intravenous cannula, and an appropriately sized blood pressure
cuff was attached to the right arm. A familiar and experienced
pediatric intensive care nurse with a pre-scripted dialog was used
as a confederate actor within the scenario.
An IVIEW XTM HED eye tracking system manufactured by
SensoMotoric Instruments was used to record the eye movements
of participants, in addition to scene video and audio recording.
The system consists of a fully mobile, head-mounted device with
two cameras attached, one recording the scene and one trained
on the participant’s eye, recording gaze and pupil data. A piece
of clear plastic was ﬁxed in front of one eye. The device was con-
nected to a notebook computer, which powered the cameras and
stored gaze, video and audio data. The gaze sampling rate used
was 50 Hz, and a ﬁxation was deﬁned as 100 ms with maximum
dispersion of 20 pixels. Based on the limitations imposed by frame
rate acquisition and the need to include all features in the intensive
care environments, features were broadly categorized as belong-
ing to one of six areas of interest (AOI). Each area of interest was
deﬁned by anatomical or environmental relationships.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic showing the location of the various areas of
interest (AoI), relative to the participant.
SCENARIOS
The two scenarios used during the study were written by two
subject-matter experts, both of whom were senior intensive care
specialists working in the pediatric intensive care unit. The sce-
narios were designed around two immediate features, the ﬁrst of
which related to the head and face of the manikin. In particu-
lar, the level of consciousness of the child would be an important
determinant in the seizure scenario, butwould be less signiﬁcant in
the context of the coughing scenario. This information would be
determined through the child’s facial features, including the eyes.
In the coughing scenario, the information provided spontaneously
by the assisting nurse was the immediate feature, since this would
be an important determinant as to whether any respiratory assis-
tance had been provided. Participants were randomly allocated to
either the coughing or the seizure scenario as their ﬁrst scenario,
and all participants completed both scenarios.
The initial disease state was identical for both scenarios with
the immediate features becoming evident as the symptomatology
emerged. A simple respiratory arrest scenario in a self-ventilating
monitored patient was used as the initial disease state, since it
avoided potentially confounding effects that might be introduced
by complex or unfamiliar equipment.
In the ﬁrstminute of the coughing scenario, the patient demon-
strated a heart rate of 150 beats per minute (BPM), blood pressure
of 77/40 and a respiratory rate of 66 breaths per minute. Satura-
tion was at 94% on 1 liter/min of nasal prong oxygen with good
connections. This information, and electrocardiography (ECG),
was displayed on the monitor. The patient showed see-saw breath-
ing with bilateral crackles as well as grunting that was cycling with
breaths. The cot was tilted at 30◦. The scenario began with the
nurse introducing the patient, saying: “The ward is about ready to
take this baby with bronchiolitis, but I’m concerned about whether
he’s OK to be discharged from PICU as he’s had a couple of short
desaturations as I’ve been looking after him this morning.” They
were also advised that the patient presented to the emergency
department the previous evening with increased respiratory work,
and was found to have respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) – pos-
itive bronchiolitis, and hyperinﬂation shown on a chest x-ray.
The patient was admitted to PICU late on the previous after-
noon for possible continuous positive airway pressure therapy,
but improved with nasal oxygen. Feeds were started at 6.00am
that morning, but had been stopped a few hours later following a
second desaturation episode. Desaturations were associated with
coughing and not with vomiting or the reﬂux of feed. No apnoea,
bradycardia, or seizure was noted at the time. The temperature
was at 37.6◦C, and the patient was not on antibiotics. A pertussis
swab had not been taken. A full blood count on admission showed
hemoglobin (Hb) of 10.7 g per deciliter, white cell count (WCC)
was 9.3 cells per cubic millimeter (Neutrophils 5.3, Leukocytes
4.0), and platelets at 210 cells per cubic milliliter.
After 1 min had elapsed, the manikin was set to cough for 20 s,
desaturate to 84% over 40 s, and become bradycardic to 104 bpm
over 40 s. At this point, the nurse prompted participants, say-
ing: “This is what he did before you came in.” After 2 min and
10 s, saturation increased to 99% if the participant had used an
oxygen bag, or to 94% if no adjustment to oxygen administra-
tion was made. Heart rate increased to 160 over 20 s, and the
patient showed grunting and see-saw rasps as had occurred previ-
ously. The scenario concluded following a duration of 3 min and
30 s.
Prior to commencing the second scenario, participants were
advised that this was a “new patient,” not related to the previous
scenario. In the ﬁrst minute of the seizure scenario, the patient had
a heart rate of 120 bpm, blood pressure of 99/70 and respiratory
rate of 33 breaths per minute. Saturation was at 94% on 1 liter/min
of nasal prong oxygen with good connections. This information,
and ECG, was displayed on the monitor. The patient showed see-
saw breathing with bilateral crackles as well as grunting that was
cycling with breaths. The cot was tilted at 30◦ and the scenario
began with the nurse introducing the patient, saying: “This baby
has just been brought up from the ward by the nurse practitioner
as he has had a couple of episodes of desaturation with stiffening of
his arms and legs on the ward. I’m a little bit worried about him
as he’s just had another similar episode and dropped his ‘sats’ to the
mid 80 s. I’ve just done a capillary gas, which is in the gas machine
now.”
The participants were also advised that the patient was a 6 week
old baby delivered at full term with no neonatal problems. The
patient was presented to the ward 2 days previously with RSV pos-
itive bronchiolitis and hyperinﬂation shown on a chest x-ray. Since
then, the patient had been on full maintenance intravenous ﬂuids
(N/4 and5%dextrose) andnil bymouth. Thepatientwas admitted
to PICU an hour earlier. Since then, he had shown desaturation
to the mid 85 associated with unusual movements of the torso
and stiffening of limbs, and an increase in heart rate. The desat-
urations would self-correct after a minute of nasal prong oxygen,
increased to 2 liter per minute. The temperature was at 37.6◦C,
and the patient was not on antibiotics. A pertussis swab had not
been taken. A full blood count on admission showed Hb of 10.7 g
per deciliter, WCC was 9.3 cells per cubic millimeter (Neutrophils
5.3, Leukocytes 4.0), and platelets at 210 cells per cubic milliliter.
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After 1 min had elapsed, the manikin was programmed to show
rapid and slow torso movements over 20 s, desaturation to 84%
over 40 s and tachycardia to 180 over 40 s. At this point, the nurse
prompted participants, saying: “This is what he did before you came
in. Here’s the cap gas (hands over blood gas analysis).”After 2 min
and 10 s, saturation increased to 99% over 20 s if the participant
had used an oxygen bag, or to 94% if no adjustment to oxygen
administration was made. Heart rate dropped to 160 over 20 s,
and the patient showed see-saw rasps with the respiratory rate
still at 33 breaths per minute. The scenario concluded following a
duration of 3 min and 30 s.
PROCEDURE
The participants completed a pre-scenario questionnaire that
included demographic questions and questions related to par-
ticipants’ subjective levels of fatigue and stress, and familiarity
with the type of scenario encountered. The eye-tracker was
then demonstrated to each participant, and the device ﬁtted
and calibrated using the recommended ﬁve-point calibration
procedure.
Each participant took part in two consecutive scenarios sepa-
rated by a 5 min interval. They waited outside the cubicle as the
scenario was set up. The two scenarios were each of 3 min and 30 s
duration and involved acute desaturation in a baby with bron-
chiolitis, due to either coughing (Scenario A) or a seizure/apnoea
(Scenario B). A nurse was present in each scenario and briefed the
clinician on the condition of the child over an equivalent period
of time. The condition recovered spontaneously regardless of the
treatment given.
Prior to each scenario, participants were reminded that they
should regard the simulator as a real patient and that their individ-
ual performance was not being reported. The scenario began with
the participant called to the bedspace by the confederate bedside
nurse who introduced the scenario with a pre-scripted state-
ment and a series of responses, and remained present throughout
each scenario. Three researchers were also present in the cubi-
cle during the study to monitor the eye-tracker, video-recording
and simulator. All remained silent and out of view during the
scenarios.
The eye-tracker automatically recorded eye movement data.
Data for each participant were collated, including the number of
ﬁxations, the duration of ﬁxations in milliseconds (dwell time),
the number of blinks, the number of saccades, and the range of
gaze. Video footage, taken from the perspective of participants,
was also recorded throughout the tasks. The software package
BeGazeTM was used to align longitudinal data with video footage
for the purposes of analysis. Video footage was analyzed frame by
frame to identify AOI. There were six AOI deﬁned in the visual
scene, namely the nurse, the monitor, the manikin’s head and face,
the manikin’s torso, the manikin’s limbs, and the wall on which
the equipment and oxygen outlets were located.
RESULTS
DATA REDUCTION
To derive information on the process of visual information acqui-
sition during initial clinical assessment, the video analysis was
limited to the ﬁrst 90 s of the scenario. Eye-tracking data for one
expert and three competent non-experts were excluded from fur-
ther analysis due to failed eye-tracking calibration. There was no
airway opening, bag and mask support, or cardiac compression
initiated by participants during the period of analysis.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics were generated for each of the dependent
variables. Across the participants and the scenarios, themeandwell
time was 448.16 ms, SD = 9.75. The mean dwell times for each of
the AOI is summarized in Table 1.
FIXATIONS AND SACCADES
Three independent, mixed between-within analyses of variance
were undertaken to establish whether a relationship existed
between participants’ level of expertise, the nature of the scenario,
and eye tracking behavior, including the frequency of ﬁxations and
saccades and the mean duration of ﬁxations (dwell time).
No statistically signiﬁcant differences were evident between
experts and competent non-experts in the frequency of ﬁxations,
F(1,10) = 1.97, p = 0.19, η2 = 0.17, or saccades, F(1,10) = 4.00,
p = 0.07, η2 = 0.29. Similarly, eye gaze data were not signiﬁ-
cantly different between the scenarios in the frequency of ﬁxations,
F(1,10) = 3.89, p = 0.07, η2 = 0.28, the frequency of sac-
cades, F(1,10) = 2.46, p = 0.15, η2 = 0.20, or the mean dwell
time, F(1,10) = 0.49, p = 0.50, η2 = 0.04.
Differences were, however, evident between experts and com-
petent non-experts in the mean dwell time, F(1,10) = 6.48,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.39, with experts’ mean dwell time,
X¯ = 472.36 ms, SD = 14.89, greater than non-experts,
X¯ = 423.36 ms, SD = 12.58. No signiﬁcant interaction was
evident between expertise and scenario for the frequency of ﬁx-
ations, F(1,10) = 0.01, p = 0.91, η2 < 0.01, the frequency of
saccades, F(1,10) = 0.04, p = 0.85, η2 < 0.01, nor the mean dwell
time, F(1,10) = 0.58, p = 0.46, η2 = 0.05.
AOI DWELL TIME ANALYSIS
For the “head and face” and “nurse” signature features, a 2 (exper-
tise) × 2 (scenario) mixed-between ANOVA was used to test
whether differences existed in the overall dwell time for experts
and competent non-experts during the 90 s, initial assessment of
the patient. It was assumed that differences in dwell time would
reﬂect differences in the relative attention to features associated
with the particular scenario. Consistent with expectations, the
results revealed a signiﬁcant difference between competent non-
experts and experts’ mean overall dwell time for “head and face,”
Table 1 | Mean dwell time (ms) by area of interest.
Area of interest Mean Std. error
Head 7183.407 1682.979
Torso 10203.959 2537.263
Limbs 374.330 143.209
Monitor 9628.809 1764.095
Nurse 4396.192 1633.480
Wall 1308.063 538.293
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F(1,12) = 6.16, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.34, whereby experts recorded
signiﬁcantly greater dwell time within the AOI, X¯ = 11358.83 ms,
SD = 2698.77, in comparison to competent non-experts, X¯
= 3007.98 ms, SD = 2011.55. A signiﬁcant difference was also
evident in the mean dwell time for the “nurse,” F(1,12) = 5.89,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.34. However, in this case, experts recorded a
signiﬁcantly lower dwell time within the AOI, X¯ = 433.63 ms,
SD = 2619.36, in comparison to competent non-experts, X¯
= 8358.76 ms, SD = 1952.38 (see Figure 2).
In the context of scenarios, a signiﬁcant main effect was evident
for the “head and face” AOI, F(1,12) = 5.69, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.32,
whereby participants recorded a greater overall dwell time for this
AOI during the seizure scenario, X¯ = 9438.06 ms, SD = 2452.35,
in comparison to the coughing scenario, X¯ = 4928.75 ms,
SD = 1199.43. This suggests that, as a cohort, both experts and
competent non-experts responded to the differences between the
scenarios by changing their pattern of information acquisition
in relation to the head and face. However, there was no change
evident in the overall dwell time on the nurse.
At a more detailed level, an expertise by scenario interaction
was evident for the mean overall dwell time on the “head and
face,” F(1,12) = 4.82, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.29. An inspection of the
means indicated that, where there was relatively little difference
between the mean dwell times for competent non-experts across
the two scenarios, a difference was evident for experts with the
mean dwell time greater during the seizure scenario than during
the coughing scenario (see Figure 3). In combination, these results
suggest that, although competent non-experts may recognize the
relative importance of signature features during different diag-
nostic scenarios, their pattern of interaction with these features
remains relatively consistent. This contrasts with expert clinicians
who appear to alter both the overall time that they devote to the
acquisition of information from signature features, together with
the pattern of acquisition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to examine the information acquisition
strategies employed by expert and competent non-expert inten-
sive care physicians during twodiagnostic scenarios that differed in
FIGURE 2 | Mean total dwell time (ms) and standard error on the
“confederate nurse” for experts and competent non-experts,
distributed across the two scenarios.
FIGURE 3 | Mean total dwell time (ms) and standard error on the
“head and face” for experts and competent non-experts, distributed
across the two scenarios.
their immediate features, but incorporated a similar intrinsic etiol-
ogy. It was anticipated that where competent non-experts would
adopt a relatively consistent pattern of information acquisition
across the scenarios, experts would vary their approach consistent
with the differences in the immediate features that were presented.
The results revealed differences in overall mean ﬁxation times
between experts and competent non-experts, with the former
maintaining visual gaze on AOIs for signiﬁcantly longer periods.
Further, experts spent signiﬁcantly more dwell time within the
“head and face”AOI and signiﬁcantly less time within the “nurse”
AOI in comparison to competent non-experts.
The differential performance amongst experts and competent
non-experts during information acquisition is consistent with the
proposition that experts and competent non-experts differ in their
repertoire of cues in memory (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995; Jaro-
dzka et al., 2010). Experts attended to the immediate visual features
associated with the patient (“head and face”), where competent
non-experts tended to spend a greater proportion of the time ﬁx-
ated on the confederate nurse. Since this occurred independent
of scenarios, it might be surmised that experts were integrating
the auditory information being delivered by the confederate nurse
with the visual information that was evident from the head and
face of themanikin. It also implies that the“head and face”embod-
ied a greater level of diagnostic information than was available
from the nurse in isolation.
Despite the fact that, overall, experts tended to spend relatively
more time than competent non-experts attending to the “head
and face,” differences were evident in the mean dwell times across
the scenarios. For competent non-experts, the relative empha-
sis on the “head and face” and “nurse” did not change with the
change in scenario, suggesting that non-experts did not necessar-
ily discriminate between the scenarios based on the immediate
features.
As hypothesized, expert physicians recorded greatermean dwell
times on the “head and face” during the seizure scenario, than
during the coughing scenario. This reﬂects the potentially greater
utility of the “head and face” in yielding diagnostic information
during the coughing scenario. The dwell time for the “confeder-
ate nurse” did not change statistically for experts, possibly due
to a restriction of range associated with the mean dwell times.
In combination, the outcomes suggest that overall, experts spent
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more time examining cues arising from the “head and face” of
the patient, but that differences in the immediate features were
associated with differences in the time spent examining the cues.
Although the results conﬁrmthat experts differ fromcompetent
non-experts in their acquisition of information during diagnostic
scenarios, it also suggests that their attention toward features in the
environment is inﬂuenced by the interaction between their task-
related experience and the immediate features that are present.
For example, it is possible that, for competent non-experts, the
situation was relatively unfamiliar and, therefore, they were seek-
ing information that would correspond to a relatively limited
number of patterns in memory. Since the “confederate nurse”
was delivering an initial assessment of the symptoms, and may
have experienced the event previously, directing attention toward
the nurse represents a reasonable strategy, where a scenario is
unfamiliar.
By contrast, experts possess a repertoire of cues in memory
and therefore, are drawn toward features that are implicitly diag-
nostic of a particular condition (Croskerry, 2009b). The relative
proportion of attention that is directed toward signature features
is consistent with a bottom-up recognition process, whereby the
environmental features trigger associations inmemory, and a serial
process of pattern matching is undertaken until a corresponding
(or near to corresponding) pattern is identiﬁed (Patel and Groen,
1986; Klein, 2008).
At an applied level, the results suggest differences in the diag-
nostic strategies employed by experts and competent non-experts,
and there are implications for training. For example, the fact that
competent non-experts tended to attend to the nurse, suggests
that they lacked a repertoire of cues in memory, necessary to rec-
ognize and adapt to the differences in the immediate features that
were presented. This was not the case for experts who were able
to identify the immediate features associated with the different
scenarios and respond appropriately. One approach to the devel-
opment of cues in memory involves cue-based training in which
learners participate in a series of scenarios, the aim of which is
to establish the relationship between features and events/objects
in memory in the form of cues (Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003). The
utility of cue-based training has been established in other domains
(e.g., Auditors), and may be appropriate for diagnostic tasks in the
medical context (Earley, 2001).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
While a weakness of this study is the relatively limited number
of participants, the fact that differences were observed between
experts and competent non-experts in relation to dwell times
points toward the underlying power of the effects that were
observed. Moreover, the study demonstrated that, in naturalistic
environments, where the number of features available is relatively
constrained and where the least experienced operators are in fact
competent, differences in information acquisition were evident.
Since the focus of this studywas information acquisition behav-
ior during the initial assessment of a potentially deteriorating
patient, the complexity associated with therapeutic interventions
was excluded. Nevertheless, it is possible that a more extended
observation may have revealed new information in the attention
to cues, and the interactions with auditory and tactile stimuli.
While these stimuli, were experimentally controlled in the present
study, future research should be directed toward examining the
relative impact of communication, and the social processes that
are engaged by different groups of physicians. This builds on the
baseline data that has been established in the present study and
contributes to a broader understanding of non-visual stimuli or
cues, and the role of team and social interactions in the recognition
of the deteriorating child by skilled clinicians.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrated differences in the information acqui-
sition behavior of experts and competent non-experts during
assessments of a deteriorating child during two in situ simulations.
Compared to competent non-experts, experts attended to speciﬁc
visual features for longer periods, and exhibited longer dwell times
on the manikin’s “head and face,” particularly during the seizure
scenario. By contrast, competent non-experts displayed longer
dwell times on the “confederate nurse.” These results were inter-
preted as evidence of differences between experts and competent
non-expert physicians’diagnostic cues inmemory. Themethodol-
ogy offers a potential framework to develop behavioral standards
of cue acquisition and utilization that could ultimately be used
for the assessment of the diagnostic performance of physicians,
particularly in time-constrained situations.
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